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Preface to the 2007 Online Edition
“1976 stuff — that must be way out of date!”    Well maybe!    But then maybe not, since no-one
else seems to have properly answered these mind-questions in the mean time! — and, by chance,
some later experimental evidence has been unexpectedly supportive.
What then are these mental-mechanism questions with no accepted solution yet?
In my view then-and-now, the key questions centre on the physical nature of Piaget’s
“scheme” (seen as an element of action and/or thought).A    Thus: — What plausible tangible
candidates are there for the role of “scheme-element”?    Might they be neurons-or-synapses?
How might they record-and-retrieve memory?    Might some of them be inherited?    Could they
intercommunicate efficiently using action-potentials?  If not, then how else?   Then what might be
the secondary logistical complications arising from any of these decisions?  and can we notionally
solve those problems too?   And (when we think we are on the right track):— Are we sure that the
whole ensemble of ideas really forms a theoretically-coherentB whole?
Perhaps surprisingly we get a similar list from Steven Rose (2004, p.215)C who has long had
rather more confidence in synaptic-transmitter mechanisms as having the key role.D  Yet now: —
[a] “Hebbianism is not sufficient ... it cannot account for the ways in which ... the putative
memory traces are disassembled and redistributed.”   [b] “Nor can it account for the renewed
lability of memory following a reminder...”;   [c] “We have no idea how recall occurs,...”;   and
[d] “Nor do we understand how chicks, and humans, derive a coherent image from...distributed
cues, the, so-called, binding problem.”
Some cases of early partial-solutions
My own two-fold impetus came from the works of Ashby and Piaget, who both built upon the
notion of a hierarchy of control.  Ashby went to some pains to investigate working hierarchical
                                                          
A
 These questions all relate to epistemology:  the study of what knowledge is, plus how-in-detail it can be
acquired, stored, and applied.    Note that the aim here is not to be content with abstract pseudo-
answers, but to insist on describing actual plausible mechanisms (on the basis of existing interdiscip-
linary knowledge) even though their existence may be “merely conjectural”, and even though such
mechanism-descriptions will doubtless remain incomplete, at least in the short term.
B
 Questions of “coherence” are discussed in detail in P.Thagard (1992), Conceptual Revolutions,
Princeton U.P. — and in Traill (2005c) www.ondwelle.com/OSM03.pdf .
    [See also the related software:   http://cogsci.uwaterloo.ca/JavaECHO/jecho.html ]
In fact this coherence-test is arguably the best criterion we have for truth, given that part of the
coherence-pattern must involve the outside world, though that is not sufficient in itself.
   [Note too that here we are applying epistemology to the social domain, though the same principle
should also tend to hold in the brain (our actual main concern) — as well as in two other separate
domains:  the immune system, and the genetic code;  see “Four learning-systems...”:  (Traill 1999,
Ch.4), Mind and Micro-Mechanism. Ondwelle: Melbourne. — www.ondwelle.com/BK0_MU6.PDF  ].
C
 S.P.R.Rose (2004) “Memory beyond the synapse”. Neuron Glia Biology, 1, 211-217. —  Re-published
online (2005) as www.open.ac.uk/science/biosci/research/rose/Memory%20Beyond%20Synapse.pdf
D
 E.g. as in the following, (listed chronologically):–
Rose, S.P.R., J.Haywood (1977). “Experience, Learning and Brain Metabolism”; in A.N.Davison:
   Biological correlates of Brain Structure and Function. Academic Press: London. [ch.8, p249-292]
Rose, S.P.R. (1981) “What should a Biochemistry of Learning and Memory be about?”  Neuroscience,
   6(5), 811-821
Patel S.N., S.P.R.Rose, & M.G.Stewart (1988). “Training induced dendritic spine density changes are
   specifically related to memory formation processes in the chick, Gallus domesticus”.
   Brain Research, 463, 168-173
Rose, S.P.R. (1992) The Making of Memory. Bantam/Transworld: London
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models, and the related information theory;  while Piaget (and colleagues such as Inhelder) did
experimental work on human development, especially with the very young, and especially
regarding the development of the implicit mathematical concepts which we adults unconsciously
take for granted.  However there is no need to repeat further details here.
Such ideas of control-hierarchies and homeostasis were current at the time — usually in
connection with “General Systems Theory” (or “Cybernetics” as it was then called, before the
term was coopted by techno-enthusiasts!).  Of particular interest is the report on the Alpbach
conferenceE of 1968, and I shall briefly mention three of its papers — works which I had not read
at the time, but might be seen as some sort of corroboration for the account presented here.
Piaget and Inhelder (1969).   Amongst other things, they critiqued the empiricist notion:
“that reality can be reduced to its observable features and that knowledge must limit itself to
transcribing these features”.  (My emphasis here and in the next paragraph).  They further
likened this to the unsound parts of Lamarckian theory, thus:  “Lamarck’s theory lacks the
basic principles of an endogenous possibility of mutation and recombination and ... of an active
capacity for self-regulation.” — (pp.118-119).
Likewise “in every field — from physics to psychology...— the essence of scientific
knowledge consists in going beyond what is observable in order to relate it to subjacent
structures.” (p.126); —  “since...it is only the underlying structure that is explanatory.” (p.148).
One might feel that Chapter V (p.21 below) is also in tune with this message.
And yes, they do also discuss the “scheme” and related issues at some length (pp.128-140),
and perhaps rather more concisely and coherently than in some of their other texts.  However that
discussion is all directed at how the abstract schemes apply to macro-psychology, and it says
nothing about our present topic of what schemes might actually be physically.  That may seem an
odd omission in view of the above quotes about “underlying structure”, but then it is seldom
possible to tie up all the loose ends in one go!
Koestler (1969).  Here he emphasized the evolutionary-efficiency of organizational-hier-
archies — and of their components which can relate flexibly to both superior and inferior units in
the system.  These components he calls “holons”, and promotes them as a wise compromise
between extreme autonomy for each unit (“atomism”), and extreme inextricable union for the
whole system (“holism”).
Thus (p.197):  
¶
The concept of the holon is meant to supply the missing link between
atomism and holism, and to supplant the dualistic way of thinking in terms of “parts” and
“wholes”, which is so deeply engrained in our mental habits, by a multi-level, stratified approach.
A hierarchically-organized whole cannot be “reduced” to its elementary parts; but it can be
“dissected” into its constituent branches of holons, represented by the nodes of the tree-diagram,
while the lines connecting the holons stand for channels of communication, control or transport-
ation, as the case may be.
·
[My emphasis,   RRT]
Note (i) that this tallies neatly with other hierarchical explanations;   and:
Note (ii) the potential importance of his distinction between “reduction” versus “dissection”.
This distinction offers a means of pacifying those overly holist critics who complain unjustly that
X’s explanatory dissection of a complex systems is  “reducing it to its parts, and thereby claiming
that the whole is ‘nothing-but-its-parts’.”   Often X has not intended to support this “Nothing-
                                                          
E
 Koestler A. & J.R.Smythies (1969) Beyond Reductionism;   Hutchinson: London.    —  And within it:
[ch.4] • Hydén, H    —    “Biochemical Approaches to Learning and Memory”;      pp. 85-117
[ch.5] • Piaget, J., &  B.Inhelder (1969).    —    “The Gaps in Empiricism”;      pp.118-159
[ch.7] • Koestler, A.    —    “Beyond atomism and holism — the concept of the holon”;  pp.192-232
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But-ism” at all; — but obviously one usually does need to do some dissection (theoretically if not
physically) before one can make a coherent explanation in substructural terms.
Some politicians like Mrs Thatcher might occasionally have such odd atomist beliefs, and
perhaps some engineers and accountants as well;  but I find it difficult to believe that any serious
modern biologists (presumably in accord with Koestler etc) could take that extreme atomist view.
It also surprises me that any would have to defend themselves against such a bizarre charge from
the rival holists.  However one can see how this latter extreme of an over-bias towards holism
might be largely a result of science’s residual bias towards excess-empiricism — (as criticized in
the above Piaget paper).  In short, this mistaken view causes epistemological problems here and
elsewhere.
This matter is discussed further in “Notes on Reductionism and related matters” [a new
(2007) addendum to this batch of republished Brunel monographs]:  www.ondwelle.com/OSM07.pdf
Hydén (1969).      Hydén and his colleagues had done extensive assay-work showing
impressive correlations between learning and associated RNA measurement, as summarized here
in his paper (pp.88-95).  Such work was to lose favour by about 1980, for disputable reasons as
discussed in Traill (2005b, §(9), pp13-14; www.ondwelle.com/OSM02.pdf );  yet his account warrants
further study, despite his own growing doubts by 1973 (ibid.).
He did offer some good arguments in favour of macromolecules as memory-store (p.88),
whilst also discrediting any “tape-recorder fashion” for encoding them (p.89).  It is thus perhaps
surprising that he did not consider fast-Darwinian selection as a viable alternative, as that could
have solved much of his impasse — fitting in with his thoughts about glia (pp.86, 94-95) and
“easy access to the genes” (p.87).
He was probably also on the right track in contemplating “a secondary system for information
processing” as possibly bridging “the gap in knowledge between electrophysiological and
biochemical data on brain cells”.  In fact, he considered ideas by Adey and Elul “that there exist
pathways for electrical currents outside the neurons in the extra-cellular spaces” (pp.95-96).  This
comes fairly close to the thoughts mooted in the new panel on page 20, below — but then any
non-physicist would almost inevitably overlook the very arcane next step into high-frequency
cable theory (which had been very controversial in the 1855-1920 period, even for engineers!).
Hydén thus led the way in important respects, despite two missed opportunities;  so some
aspects of the present project may be re-inventing his wheel.  Meanwhile his paper also offers a
further service.  It reminds us, despite any “secondary system”, that the traditional action-
potential system does indeed learn (even if the second system does it faster or with greater precis-
ion), and he discusses likely mechanisms for this primary system (pp.98-99).
Notes about the present text
As far as practicable, this account follows the text of the original 1976 collection.  Any
variations should be obvious, but a list of revision-identifiers appears in small print at the bottom
of the title page — e.g. note the use of capital letters to indicate the new footnotes, while old
footnotes retain the original numerals or asterisks etc.  Diagrams have been re-drawn in digital
form, but following closely to the originals.
The main practical change is the liberal insertion-or-updating of references to “future” works,
including web-links where possible.  However any fully-new references have been left either in-
text or within the footnotes.  They have not been added to the pre-existing “References” sections,
though my own self references (new and old) are re-compiled into a final convenience-list, p.33.
R. R. Traill
Melbourne,   5 April 2007
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Original Introduction
The linear micro-element theory emerged initially as a part of an attempt to formulate Piaget’s
view of mental development in some sort of “mechanistic” form.  To this was added the further
requirement that any such model should at least make sense in biochemical and physiological
terms.  The main purpose then, was to reconstruct a reasonably specific and detailed model as a
basis for specific criticism and/or modification, and also as a more tangible “heuristic” (right or
wrong) on which to build one’s concepts of a hitherto vaguely defined process.
It remains to be decided just how valid this particular theory might be, but meanwhile it has
proved possible to elaborate the existing formulation further such as to encompass a wider range
for phenomena than those originally contemplated;  and this may perhaps be taken as an
encouraging sign.    Anyhow, this volume constitutes, in part, a record of such subsequent
developments in the theory (excluding the more physiological by-products — which have
however already been outlined in Monograph 15).G
The question of validating such models brings us into the realm of Scientific Method — the
second topic dealt with in this volume.  The case developed here may be stated in a weak or
strong form.  The weaker claim is that where there is a dearth of experimental evidence
specifically relating to an area of interest, it is nevertheless legitimate to “re-design” (into our
model) whatever seems likely to be going on covertly; — provided we pay due regard to indirect
evidence in related disciplines (formulated with sufficient precision for us to be able to narrow
the range of “feasible” solutions), and provided we always bear in mind that we may have
happened to hit on the “wrong” design.  It is theoretically possible, though most unlikely for the
current study, that such a wrong design would escape detection indefinitely in the face of new
indirect evidence — as long as we do not close our minds to such new evidence.
The stronger statement asserts that (strictly speaking) we can never do anything other than
follow this method of constructing knowledge — simply because there is no such thing as
absolutely direct evidence.  Of course some evidence is much more direct than others, but
however good it may seem to be, there will always be a logical flaw in it somewhere;  and this
flaw will consist of some act of “re-design” — as if to say  “it must be this way if it is to make
sense”.   (Often this flaw may be traced to our infantile learning experiences with geometrical
objects — or even to genetically coded “learning experiences” of our species).   If this is true so
that evidence can never be wholly satisfactory, then it seems unjustifiable to postpone indefinitely
any attempt to formulate a particular topic on the pretext that there is “no direct evidence” —
since, in practice, this excuse would now imply the use of an arbitrary cutoff decision-point
between “direct (enough)” and “indirect”.
It is the above concept of “re-designing unseen reality (into our model of reality)”,  or  “that’s
the way it must1 be if it is to make sense”  which is intended by the more formal term:  internal
closure.F  Although I have laid some stress on the importance of internal closure, it should not be
imagined that I am claiming it as a cure for all ills.  For one thing, it merely complements
experimentation and certainly does not replace it.  Then paradoxically, its very neglect is a
consequence of its own inappropriate over-use elsewhere!  An apparently successful (i.e.
internally self-consistent) system of beliefs based on internal closure within an initial set of
“data”, can be very resistant to revision when the body of data grows in volume or precision — as
Galileo and many others have discovered to their cost.
                                                          
1
 Of course, the word “must” should not be taken too literally!
F
 Here “closure” is almost synonymous with “coherence” used in later writings, although “closure”
stresses a two-dimensional (2D) arrangement of linkages, whereas “coherence” implies (3+)D; — i.e.
having a (virtual) interlink-structure which looks more robust when represented by a digraph diagram.
In fact this verbal-connection was raised in a 1976 letter, see page 32, below — (in Chapter VII).
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This locking-in to false models explains Science’s aversion to the overt use of internal closure.
But it seems that the problem is ultimately inescapable, and this aversion itself seems to be a
locked-on case of internal closure — though perhaps at a higher level of abstraction.  To this
dilemma there is no panacea, though it may prove to be of some value to make the problem explicit.
I had originally intended to group these papers according to the two themes.   However as this
area of study is an evolving one, with interaction between the two topics, it seemed better to
present the papers chronologically, and distinguish between the themes by asterisking those
dealing with Scientific Method.   (As a further chronological guide:  the two Kybernetes papersG
and “Monograph 12” should precede Chapter I;   and  “Monograph 15” comes between Chapters
IV and V) — [see new note-panel on page 20 — where this “Chapter IV½” might have been inserted]:
R. R. Traill
    October 1976
                                                          
G
 The two Kybernetes papers later formed Part A of the Thesis (1978/2006), now available online:
www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-A.pdf  (2006)    —    though the references are currently in a separate
collective file (for Parts A, B, and C together):  www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-Refs.pdf
(Alternatively see the BURA website where the same material is available within a single document).
The two papers were both actually written within 1975.
Monograph 12:  (1976 Feb). Thinking as Mental Model-Building: a Piagetian-cum-mechanistic
explanation of the ‘engram’. Brunel University Cybernetics Dept. — from Nottingham BPS
conference (Philosophy of Psychology seminar,  7 April 1975) — now available online as:
— www.ondwelle.com/OSM04.pdf   (2007a).
Monograph 15:  (1976 Apr) The Gulf between Behavioural Psychology and Fundamental Physiology:
a systematic attempt to bridge the gap.  Brunel University Cybernetics Dept. — from York BPS
conference (Workshop on Memory, April 1976) — now available online as:
— www.ondwelle.com/OSM05.pdf   (2007b)
[RRT, April 2007].
Short papers on Stringlike Mental-Mechanisms ——  8  of  33 and related questions of scientific method
Brunel Univ. Cyb. Monogr. No. 18,  (Oct. 1976) [ www.ondwelle.com/OSM06.pdf — 2007c] © R.R.Traill (1976, 2007)
Sensori-motor Development of Object Concepts:  a mechanistic hypothesis
Chapter I
ABSTRACT  (from pp 62-63 of the Conference Proceedings)
Assuming a mechanistic basis for mind, we are faced with the problem of spelling out, in
detail, just how the basic mechanisms could work.  Moreover any such explanation must be
constrained by what is feasible (given existing physiological, biological and psychological
knowledge).
Instead of Hebb’s adaptable synapses, let us take RNA-like codeable “tapes” as the basic raw
material for memory.  Mental constructs like “objects” are seen as models which are built up
piecewise during interaction with the real world;  and these “pieces” are encodings (often heavily
replicated) within a huge “tape”-population.
Coordination between individual tapes is seen as essentially biochemical cross-feedback, but
achievable at a distance through the intermediary of electrical signals.
Such signals would apparently need to be made up of infra-red frequency components.
Calculations suggest that at just such frequencies, the myelinated axons become able to ‘mail-sort’
any complex signal components into time-and-space ‘pidgeon holes’;  whereas lower frequencies
remain unmodified and unsorted.
During Piaget’s sensori-motor stages 1 and 2, genetically produced blank or pre-set scheme-
“tapes” become modified by mechanisms similar to genetic recombinations, and then eliminated
whenever they are non-adaptive.  (This appears to be consistent with classical and operant
conditioning).  Subsequently such schemes appear to become categorized within cross-referenced
“lists” in “higher-order schemes”.  When such systems achieve mutual corroboration (akin to
mathematical “group closure”) they become inherently stable as “schemata”.
This paper considers the modelling of geometrical objects, but essentially the same process is
believed to operate, with varying degrees of success, for less well defined concepts (e.g. see
[chapter II, following] for the cases of self-identity and superego).
Also, a recursive recapitulation of the whole process “at higher levels” is seen as explanation
for Piaget’s Pre-operational/Concrete-Operational Period and Formal Operations Period.
1RWHVIURPKDQGRXW
A.  Postulated “building blocks”  from which the system is to be developed.
/LQHDU³VWULQJV´RU³WDSHV´RIFRGHGLQIRUPDWLRQVWRUHGFKHPLFDOO\DUHVHHQDVEDVLF
elements — rather than Hebb’s adaptable synapses.
6XFKHOHPHQWVDUHVHHQDVEHLQJSRZHUOHVVLQGLYLGXDOO\²QRUPDOO\GHSHQGLQJRQH[WHQVLYH
replication of a given species of element before any behavioural manifestations will be
detectable.   (Such a replicated species, acting in coordination, offers a basis for Piaget’s
“scheme”).
7KHSURJUDPLWHPVcodeable into such linear sequences will include instructions to “call”
specific motor activity into effect,  or to modify input-processes such as focussing, or to call
Display Paper presented at the Tenth Annual Conference of the Australian Psychological Society,
La Trobe University, 16-22 August 1975.      #11/75
This paper summarises, pictorially, the ideas inherent in the author’s three cited references, and also
foreshadows later papers which postulate a physiological role for infra-red information-transmission:
“Brunel Monograph 15” (April 1976)G, and hence “Brunel Monograph 24” (1977/1980).
[The latter is now available online as Thesis Part-B:  www.ondwelle.com/MolecMemIR.pdf — references included]
The main topic concerning “linear micro-elements” is further elaborated in Chapter VI of this volume,
[page 21] [and was later (1978) developed further within Thesis — Chapter C5:   www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-C1-5.pdf    
and  Section C6.7:   www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-C6.pdf  —  plus references:  www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-Refs.pdf
OR see the Brunel University Research Archive (BURA) website where these three texts are all in the same 203-page document ]
Short papers on Stringlike Mental-Mechanisms ——  9  of  33 and related questions of scientific method
Brunel Univ. Cyb. Monogr. No. 18,  (Oct. 1976) [ www.ondwelle.com/OSM06.pdf — 2007c] © R.R.Traill (1976, 2007)
other such linear sequences into effect or into readiness (Possibly like computer “sub-
programming”, but probably more flexibly — allowing for simultaneous reading, etc).
Furthermore, such call-codes should be capable
of being qualified by an auxilliary code —
distinguishing between  (i) actual executions,
(ii) calling into readiness,  and (iii) a mere
“symbolic” reference to such a potential call
(to action, or to another “tape”).
,ID³WDSH´LVWREH³FDOODEOH´WKHQLWPXVWSUHVXP
ably have one or more distinguishable labels
implicit in part of its coding sequence.  As we have seen, it should be callable by other
“tapes”; but it should also be callable (in many cases) by specific patterns of sensory input.
&RPSDUHGZLWKQRUPDOFKHPLFDOWUDQVDFWLRQV
very large distances will often be involved.
Efficient “calling” seems to require that signals
be transmitted as infra-red, along myelinated
segments of axon.  The effective memory-
centres may thus be the Nodes of Ranvier
(and the glia within range of the end of the
myelin sheath), as well as [neuronal] cell-
bodies.  Transmission down the next segment
might be a faithful copy or it might not.
Given the expected range of frequencies, and the dimensions of existing myelinated axons, it
would be technically feasible for a call to be emitted as a carefully-shaped pulse, and then
received remotely as a specific key-like sequence of pulses or waves.  This might suffice to
“catalyse” the postulated effects.
B.  Postulated sensori-motor development of the object-concept
— using the “building materials” just discussed
FIRST SUB-PERIOD
Stage 1 (not directly observable till later):
fortuitous pairing,  eg           a b           (c)
    (recognisable          (action) (satisfying consequence)
        feature)
and/or fortuitous substitution, starting from hereditary “blank” schemes:
eg
Technical considerations:
In view of the type of chemical storage
thought to be involved, it seems likely that
the signals required for such “calls” will start
and finish as electro-magnetic complexes in
the infra-red range of frequencies.  If they can
also be transmitted in the same form, then so
much the better.
Technical considerations:
Circuit theory is really only an approximat-
ion, applicable to lowish frequencies.
For infra-red, myelinated axons should be
considered using radio-theory or optics
instead.   In principle, such coaxial cable can
carry signals of any frequency, if the
constituent materials are appropriate.
a f1
(callable
label)
(facilitate
other)
(proceed if
facilitated)
p1
a f2
(label sensitive
to same call)
(facilitate
other)
(proceed if
facilitated)
p2
(c)
(common
consummation
feelings)
h
m
(mouth
program)
(hand     
     program)









resulting in
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Stage 2 (also clandestine).
The more frequently used schemes acquire stability;  perhaps because they are more heavily
replicated, allowing for positive feedback supports to develop more readily — at least somewhere
within the population.  Such stabilised entities are then referred to as “schemata”H.
SECOND SUB-PERIOD
Because of the increased stability, it becomes feasible to keep references of such entities
without the “object” itself vanishing;  so now we may expect the development of “symbolic”
references to them.  This means that it is possible to set up higher-order schemes which list other
schemes, thus forming a set.  Notably:–
a b1 (c)
a b2 (c) a  b1
which gives a slight advance towards [mathematical]-group structure :
b2 (c)
Next add new starting-points elsewhere round the loop, adding more directed topological links.
When “drive” changes,  c  may also act as a starting point, so that true reversibility then
becomes possible.  (This gives a two-dimensional group, and hence a “feel for 2D objects”).
7KH3RVWHU'LVSOD\DVSUHVHQWHG
THEORETICAL:  Piaget/Neurophysiology
Piaget’s scheme is seen as simply a gross, summated, behavioural manifestation of many
replicated code-elements.  These would be of molecular size, and act in co-operation.
(Synaptic effects (Hebb 1949, Eccles):  relevant but secondary).
$FWLYLW\RIWKHVHHOHPHQWVZRXOGEHVWDUWHGFRordinated, and executed utilising high-
frequency components in neural-network signals.  These would encode highly specific call-
signals capable of activating other scheme-elements — or motor tracts.
/LNHO\³DQDWRP\´RIVXFKDQ51$OLNHVFKHPHHOHPHQWVLPSOHW\SH
}{
Use object schemata as basis
for next period (Operational),
just as simple input or action
codings served as elements to
the sensori-motor
Develop further for 3D objects
(stages 5 and 6)
LABEL SEGMENT
PROGRAM SEGMENT
(OPTIONAL)
AFFECT TAG(S)
(Not necessarily situated
in this position)
Sensitive to a
particular signal-
pattern which will
“call” the element
into action
The constituent units
initiate similar “calls” to
other scheme-elements,
and to efferent motor fibres
This tag is seen as
determining the
likelihood of
 (i) replication,  or
 (ii) dissolution;
as well as having
subjective affect
manifestations
[This diagram appeared again later as Fig.C5.2/1 within the 1978 Thesis:
  www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-C1-5.pdf     — (original page 192) ]
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————————— oOo —————————
Types of scheme/schemaH element
Some are hereditary (and more-or-less infinitely replaceable, when used up or dissolved).
{Basis for hereditary schemes:  cf. Bruner, etc.}
Some are spontaneous “mutations” of the above.  These become tagged with affect according to
experience. {Basis for ordinary schemes}
Some are associated into a more-or-less permanent self-sustaining “compound”
{Basis for schemata}
Any of these types would be capable of forming “higher order” elements, thus effectively
forming a set of “listed” lower-order schemes/schemata.  (An important role for higher-order
elements would be to form “lists” of lower elements — initially indiscriminate, but dropping
those members which were insufficiently “similar” to other members of the list).
————————— oOo —————————
Eg   Development of the scheme for a two-dimensional “object” such as a square:
Let  a,c,m,n  =  the internal codes which come to be associated
with the four “real” states  A,C,M,N.
L  Fortuitously mutated and executed LL  Similarly
scheme-element:
such that
    And LLL
Hence     And Y  reversibility becomes possible —
  LY     given a change in the drive state (to m, say).
                                                          
H
 There is some disorder in the Piagetian distinction between “scheme” and “schema” (plurals:
“schemes” and “schemata”), see discussion in  www.ondwelle.com/OSM02.pdf   (Traill, 2006b —
footnote 5 on its page 6,  and in the Appendix, pp.21-22).
Piaget himself (usually!) took schema as “figurative”, which is arguably close to the usage here.
A  N
M  C
 a
     c
(b1)  LABEL    PROGRAM
      a          b1
 a
     c
(b2)
code for
fortuitous
act
 m      c
(b3)
     n
     c
(b4)
 a      n(b6)
 a
 m      c
(b5)
 m      c
(b7)
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And so on, till eventually all relevant
“group” moves have been mastered
(incorporated in the set):–
5HIHUHQFHV&KDSWHU,
Monod, J. , and F.Jacob (1961). “General conclusions: telenomic mechanisms in cellular metabolism,
growth, and differentiation” Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative Biology, 26, 389-401.
Piaget, J. (1954/1968) . The Construction of Reality in the Child. Routledge & Kegan Paul: London
Piaget, J., and B.Inhelder (1948/1956/1963). The Child’s Conception of Space. Routledge & Kegan
Paul: London.
Piaget, J., and B.Inhelder (1966/1971). Mental Imagery in the Child. Routledge & Kegan Paul: London.
Traill, R.R. (1975a). Thinking as mental model-building: a Piagetian-cum-mechanistic explanation of
the ‘engram’.  Paper presented at the Nottingham BPS conference (Philosophy of Psychology
seminar,  7 April 1975) — (1976 Feb) Monograph 12, Cybernetics Dept., Brunel University.   —
Now available online as:  www.ondwelle.com/OSM04.pdf   (2007a)
Traill, R.R. (1976a). “Acquisition of knowledge without transcendental assistance: an extended
Piagetian approach”. Kybernetes, 5(2), 73-82. — Now available online as Chapters A1 and A2
within  www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-A.pdf  (2006) + references  www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-Refs.pdf
Traill, R.R. (1978). “Analytical theory of sensori-motor spatial development”. Kybernetes, 7, 61-71.
[At the time (Oct. 1976), this was still “in press”]. — Now available online as Chapter A3, also
within  www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-A.pdf  (2006) + references  www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-Refs.pdf
(b7)
METHODOLOGY
These two papers (Chapters I & II)
are theoretical, and quite possibly
un-testable in any direct sense.
 
H
 Under what circumstances is
such an approach justified?
This question of
Scientific Method
is discussed here in
 Chapters V and VII.
(RRT, 1976)
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Self-construction of Personal Identity:
an extension of the mechanistic mental object hypothesis
Chapter II
ABSTRACT  (from pp 61-62 of the Conference Proceedings)
The linear-element population model of the Piagetian scheme was described in the previous
paper, where it was used to explain the formation of object schemata.  To this, the complications of
non-rigidity and breakableness of objects is now added, followed by a postulated mechanism for
affect phenomena and some indication of its formal role within the terms of the model.
The self-concept is seen as being a further development on the same fundamental lines, but
with crucial differences in detail, including:–
1.   “Autonomy” which implies:  goal representation in advance;  effective availability of
schemes or schemata capable of producing consummation;  availability of “wrong choice”
schemata;  and alos the availability of an effective choice between them.  Where (e.g.) parents “use
their children instrumentally”, this can prevent the child’s higher-order ideas (schemata) from
developing normally, resulting in an “unreal” concept of autonomy.
(The superego is also seen as at least one schema (imago) of roughly comparable salience.
The “unreal” concept of self is seen as arising from the creation of a common self-superego
schema, the inconsistencies of which may be “resolved” non-adaptively by a split into an
“autonomous inner-self” and an “outer” perfunctory-behaviour/body/environment schema —
Laing’s concept of psychosis).
2.   Intensity of affect.  In general, affect is seen as an essential ingredient for making
complex subjective decisions (dependent on context, and without any overall precise model).  It is
envisaged as operating via “tags” on the linear scheme codings (like episomes in virology), and
grossly influencing categorization processes amongst the “Scheme-tapes” concerned.  This
influence will depend on the “drive-or-sleep state”.
3.   Consciousness.  Here a mechanistic explanation becomes more difficult!  Some tentative
suggestions are offered.
7KH3RVWHU'LVSOD\DVSUHVHQWHG
THEORETICAL:  Freudian/Neurophysiological
(First see Chapter I,  above)
$VFKHPHQHHGQRWQHFHVVDULO\KDYHSHUIHFWJURXSOLNHVWUXFWXUHDVLQWKH'REMHFWDWWKH
close of Chapter 1, above) especially if aided by favourable affect tags.  Thus less well
defined concepts can also form;  (E.g. Erikson’s “Basic Trust” or “Mistrust”).
$Qego schema would also be of this “fuzzy” type.  Further it is seen as having essentially the
same qualitative status as any other fuzzy schema, except perhaps some specialization in its
affect tags.
7KLVego schema is seen as developing from hereditary scheme elements, and first forming as
“the set of actions which produce reasonably reliable results”.  This “higher order” schema
would normally acquire positive affect and embody a concept of available power (autonomy).
Display Paper (as a sequel to the then adjacent display, now Chapter  I) at the Tenth Annual
Conference of the Australian Psychological Society, La Trobe University, 16-22 August 1975. #12/75
   This paper sketches the way in which the ideas of the previous paper might be extended to wider,
non-geometrical concept-formation and dynamics.  It is thus a forerunner of Chapter VI in this volume
[page 22], and of the related 1978 Thesis (Part C), then still in preparation:
www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-C1-5.pdf   ff., especially §C6.3  in  www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-C6.pdf
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$Q\VHULRXVDQGVXGGHQGLVLOOXVLRQPHQWDERXWDQ\FDSDELOLWLHVFORVHO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHHJR
schema may thus lead to a negative affect tagging of the ego-schema as a whole — with
pathological consequences;  e.g. Kimmel (ed)(1970).
 
Fig (i).     Idealized unperturbed(!)
ego-schema.   Likely to be unstable
due to lack of use — (i.e. lack of
predictive “external closure”)
Fig (ii).   Normal moderately perturbed
ego-schema, with some re-adjustment
(cf. Festinger’s Cognitive Dissonance).
Conditions favourable to development of a
“higher order” level — to aid this process.
etc. etc.
 L3  &/or  L4
 L2
 L1
“high order”
levels
“low order”
Pressure for growth
(‘to’ gain adaptive control)
 L3  &/or  L4
 L2
 L1
“high order”
levels
etc. etc.
“OUTER SELF”
+ reality-constructs
“INNER SELF”
(which then tends to
become insulated and
therefore less stable)
Fig (iii).   Traumatized ego schema with start of adult schizoid “solution” to the problem;
(Laing’s conceptualization).
LEGEND
   = component with positive
affect tag
   = component with negative
affect tag
      } = communication links
     (non-mechanical)
                    = control link
       (non-mechanical)
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³1HXURWLFVROXWLRQV´WRWUDXPDSHUKDSVHQWDLOD³SURWHFWLYHFRDWLQJ´DURXQGWKHQHJDWLYHDIIHFW
elements “|”) — achieved spontaneously (i.e. homeostatically within the same level and
thus difficult to access from a higher “more conscious” level).
6XSHUHJRLVVHHQDVRQHRUPRUHVFKHPDLPDJRHPERG\LQJWKHSHUFHLYHGSURSHUWLHVRI
another “person”.  Provisionally this may be thought of as being at L3 level (rather than L2). I
Consciousness may be explicable in terms of a highest order schema (or scheme) having a
privileged access to the communication network — (and hence attention ?).
5HIHUHQFHV&KDSWHU,,
Jacob, F., and E.L.Wollman. (1961). “Viruses and genes”. Scientific American, 204, 92-107.
Kimmel, H.D., ed. (1971b). Experimental Psychopathology: Recent research and theory. Academic
Press; New York and London.
Laing, R.D. (1960/1965). The Divided Self. Penguin: Harmondsworth, Middlesex.
Traill, R.R. (1975b). “Sensori-motor development of object concepts: a mechanistic hypothesis”. Paper
presented at the tenth annual conference of the Australian Psychological Society, La Trobe
University, August 1975. [Chapter I (above) in the present volume, pp.8-12].
Wolman, B.B. (1970). Children Without Childhood. Grune & Stratton: New York and London.
                                                          
I
 Concerning “L1 ... L4 ...”.     In later writings I have used a different notation for these levels:
The basic L1 level (usually taken to be the essence of Piaget’s “sensori-motor” developmental stage, as
in the newborn), I have chosen to re-label as either just “L”, or equivalently as “M0L”.
   The L2 level above L is a meta-level (ML), or “M1L”.   Likewise    L3 = “M2L”;     L4 = “M3L”; ...
   The apparent complication has this advantage:   It helps to fit in with the “meta–” terminology of
philosophy and mathematics,  and thereby emphasizes the capacity for the recursive control which was
much discussed by Ross Ashby ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Ross_Ashby ), especially in his book
Design for a Brain (1952/1960/1966).
   In either case it is convenient to have an index-number  n  (for  MnL  or  Ln+1), such that n=0 tallies
with Piaget’s sensori-motor level.  This also makes systematic provision for the possibility that there
may also be overlooked lower levels below sensori-motor.  Any such lower levels can now be referred
to as M–1L,  M–2L,  etc.  for any tedious subprocessing which Piaget did not contemplate.  (If such sub-
levels do exist, they may well be analogous to the unseen subprogramming which underlies today’s
elaborate software:   machine coding of which most users are totally unaware). RRT, 2007
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A Defence of the Linear Micro-Element
Chapter III
Dear Norman
Thank you very much for taking the trouble to sort through the issues raised in my draft
article[5].    I think I can make some sort of defence on most of your points, ......
Your points seem to be:
(1) How translate elec. signals to RNA (or whatever)?
(2) How RNA... might replicate, (via DNA? If so, how?)
(3) How translate RNA... to electrically mediated action?
(4) What exptl evidence is there (or can there be)?
(5) What facts are inconsistent with my theory?
(6) What’s so terribly wrong with current plastic-synapse theories?
(l & 3) Translation between elec/Chem:  Firstly, I have not come across any existing theory
which adequately explains this in full Phys/Chem rigorous detail.  (E.g. I have just gone carefully
through Pribram’s 1971 book[4];  and granting him his holograms etc, he still does not seem to
have tackled the mechanics of this vexing last stage of the process).  Secondly, I have an idea that
I may be on to an explanation in terms of much higher frequency components (>>1000 c/s) of
electromagnetic radiation.  This sounds a bit far-fetched until one thinks that  (i) this is what one
might expect from the basic molecular sources,  and (ii) the accepted phenomena such as 1 m.sec
“spikes” should be explicable as envelopes of high-frequency phenomena (like the audio-
frequency transmission in radio) — nor need this render the “spike-concept” redundant — just
less-than-complete.   See [“Technical considerations”:  in section A3.3 [5]  — and above in Chapter I, section A].
I have half drafted a paper going into this in more depth [Draft-Ref.10/75]J,  and I have done some
calculations for a second one concerning some unexpected embryological implications — control
of the dimensions of the myelin sheath.K
(4 & 5)  Offhand I rather think that my theory can be regarded as subsuming existing
theories, but I wouldn’t like to be dogmatic at this stage; Pribram writes about two types of
phenomena, why not three (especially if the third also happens to be a building-block for the
others)?  Anyhow such compatibility would (if true) dispose of point “(5)”.  As for testability (4),
this is a problem  —  see  [“Methodology” panel at the close of Chapter I in this volume];  though if we
accept the infra-red hypothesis as an integral part of the theory then this just might be testable,
                                                          
J
 later[7] re-written (1977) as Thesis Part B, alias Brunel Monograph 24 —
www.ondwelle.com/MolecMemIR.pdf        Also see the sequel:  • Traill (1988), “The case that mammalian
intelligence is based on sub-molecular coding and fibre-optic capabilities of myelinated nerve axons”.
Speculations in Science and Technology, 11(3), 173-181.
K
 This account eventually appeared as Chapters 6&7 of the 1999 book:  www.ondwelle.com/BK0_MU6.PDF   
and was developed further in the online paper (2006a):  www.ondwelle.com/OSM01.pdf .
Relevant extracts from a letter (dated 26 September 1975) to Dr N E Wetherick concerning his
comments on the draft of the paper  “Analytical Theory of Sensori-motor Spatial Development”, which
later appeared as (i) the second Kybernetes paper ((1978): 7, 61-71);   (ii) as Chapter A3 of the Thesis;
 and in 2006 (iii) online within  www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-A.pdf — [5]
     #14/75
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e.g.  (i) micro-fibre optical tests,    (ii) imposed signals using I.R. lasers,    (iii) fluorescent
“indicators” of neural transmission (already reported[3]) might be explained in these terms.L
However, on philosophical grounds, I would not accept that exptl “untestability” (sic)
necessarily means non-existence.  See draft 13/75 [since superseded by Chapter V of this volume, p.21].
I suspect that a non-realization of this has had a serious stagnating effect on science in general
(espec Psych & Physics[2]).
(2) Replication of RNA.  Good question!  The route via DNA which you allude to does seem
to be a practical possibility as there is an enzyme which mediates a reverse copying (from RNA
to DNA).  Personally though, I think that the following sounds “more biological”: under
favourable conditions (of course) the RNA (or..)-to-be-copied is “read out” into electrical signals
and almost-simultaneously used to “write” new RNA(or..) codings.  This does seem rather
fanciful, but given a dispersive medium it is remotely feasible — though it seems difficult to see
how the new coding could be in the same “language” (but maybe this would not matter).M
Moreover this is arguably no more fanciful than the reversal enzyme system (which would
involve a two-stage process, and that common office-problem of what to do with the “permanent”
DNA record of the transaction;  to me it seems more biological to dispense with dubious records
and stages, and neat observable delays, — instead things tend to be done “on the run” with scant
regard for the observer and his modelling problems).  Mind you, this still leaves a lot unsaid;
I shall have to give it further thought.  What do you think?
(6) What’s wrong with the plastic-synapse?  In brief, I have found it hard to see how, on its
own, this could be built into a thoroughgoing explanation of the more precise types of behaviour.
I suspect it on a number of grounds, none of them (yet) conclusive, but collectively contributing
to an overall skepticism.  So far I have never attempted to commit these suspicions to paper, but it
should do me good to start right now:-  (a) OK, evidence exists that such changes do occur (cited
in Pribram[4]), but this says nothing about how important the changes are;  they may just be long-
term re-adjustment of weightings, or applicable to only certain types of memory, or even
necessary but not sufficient.
(b) As suggested above, no-one seems to have explained in detail just how the read/write
coding could work by this method.  Pribram postulates “induction” (p43) as a byproduct of a
specific induced mitosis;  but how is the mitosis induced?  Elec/RNA?!
                                                          
L
 [A surprising new “test-possibility (iv)” arose recently when an anomaly in insect behaviour seemed
explicable by invoking IR as a component within their nervous systems, involving chitin rather than
myelin (Traill, 2006c, bottom of p.13 – top of p.15):  www.ondwelle.com/OSM03.pdf .  This would be
comparatively easy to test, though its human-significance could only be suggestive pending further
work. RRT, 2007]
M
 [A better suggestion which arose later:   Note that SPECIES-EVOLUTION faces the same formal
problem:  “How am I to write down the lessons I learn?”  It seems likely that the main solution in both
cases will be:  No actual “tape-recording” at all, but rather a multitude of randomly generated internal
suggestions, most of which are then scrapped when they do not fit with reality — i.e. Darwinian
selection in both cases, though at vastly different speeds!     (If synapses really were the key memory-
mechanisms, they would probably not be sufficiently numerous-or-organized to offer a practical
mental-system of this Darwinian sort, unless aided by some auxiliary system.  However any
significant molecular-coding base could offer a vastly bigger pool of “suggestions” from which to
make rapid selections).
(Traill, 1999, Chapters 2&4): www.ondwelle.com/BK0_MU6.PDF ;
(Traill, 2000, Chapter 5): www.ondwelle.com/BK1_V28.PDF .
     Then again, close inspection shows that Piaget’s much earlier “action first” interpretation had also
implied this Darwinian trial-and-error within infant-learning;  see  www.ondwelle.com/OSM02.pdf ]
RRT, 2007
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(c) Brindley G S (1969) “Nerve net models of plausible size that perform many simple
learning tasks” Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B, 174, 173-191.    This paper goes into calculations
concerning information storage capacity, and I do not find the results sufficiently convincing,
bearing in mind the staggering capacity we have for remembering “trivial” incidental details of
everyday life, and the redundancy which must be needed for such a robust system made of
chancy elements.
(d) Recent electron-microscopy has shown up a wealth of structural detail, down to roughly
molecular levels of scale; and it doesn’t seem to me to make biological/evolutionary sense for
such structure not be seized upon for functional purposes.  Moreover if discrete information is to
be stored, why use a “floppy” thing like a synapse rather than a more compact and predictable
element at molecular level?  (Of course Pribram would say that memory may have continuous
“analogue” elements as well, and perhaps these would be retained more appropriately in an
adaptable synapse. OK, nihil obstat, but I am more immediately interested in the discrete
elements).
(e) Presumably synaptic modification would be a comparatively slow process, and meanwhile
memory would be retained (according to the orthodox view) in reverberations around neural
loops or such-like.N  This would seem to be even more grossly wasteful of facilities, indeed it is
difficult to see how such a procedure could retain sufficient precision in the details without gross
corruption (especially given a reasonably limited number of neurons) or indeed just how an
appropriate loop could be allocated and reserved during use — unless perhaps a molecular-based
steering mechanism were used (in which case it might obviously be better to forget the wasteful
loops altogether and adapt the molecular mechanism — maybe evolution did just that).
-    -    -    -    -    -    -    -
5HIHUHQFHV&KDSWHU,,,
1. Brindley, G S (1969), “Nerve net models of plausible size that perform many simple learning tasks”
Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B, 174, 173-191.
2. Bunge, M (1973), Philosophy of Physics, D Reidel: Dordrecht
3. Cohen, L B, et al (1974), “Changes in axon fluorescence during activity:  Molecular probes of membrane
potential”, J Membrane Biol., 19, 1-36
4. Pribram, K H (1971), Languages of the Brain, Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, N J
5. Traill, R.R. (1978). “Analytical theory of sensori-motor spatial development”. Kybernetes, 7, 61-71.
— [Then still “in press”.     Now available onlineO within Thesis Part A.] #7/75
6. Traill, R R (1976), Sensori-Motor Development of object concepts: A Mechanistic Hypothesis,
(Chapter I of this volume) #11/75
7. Traill, R R [1977/1980], Toward a theoretical explanation of electro-chemical interaction in memory
use: the postulated role of infra-red components; — later published as Monograph 24, Cybernetics
Department, Brunel University (1977/1980); and as Thesis, Part B — www.ondwelle.com/MolecMemIR.pdf
#17/75
                                                          
N
 Early computers used acoustic reverberation-loops through mercury or stiff wires — with the signal
being delayed by that medium, next “tidied up” at the end of that journey, and then repeatedly sent
through again.  Not surprisingly, that technique has long been obsolete for most purposes. [RRT, 2007]
O
 Thesis, Part A:   www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-A.pdf  (Chapter A3)  plus references in the separate file:
www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-Refs.pdf  ——  or see the BURA website (Brunel University Research
Archive) for a 203-page file which contains both.
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A Critique of Computer-Validation as a test for Brain Theories
Chapter IV
On reflection, I would like to query your apparent criterion for the validity of mental-
mechanism-theories.  If I understood correctly (from private conversation), you were concerned
that such a theory should be modellable on a computer — though I am not now clear as to just
how much importance you placed on this, or what other criteria you migh seek (additionally or
alternatively), or whether you were talking exclusively of digital computers.  Indeed perhaps you
really meant “exhaustive formal specification” — in which case I would probably agree with you.
Arguably there are three types of criteria for such models which purport to represent reality:–
(1) Empirical criterion:      Are the basic “relatively static” elements of the model
“indubitably” identifiable with the real world?   This is a philosophical minefield, which I fear
modern physics has run foul of — carrying many other disciplines with it; (Bunge (1973);
Traill (1976a, Part II)P).
For one thing I would suggest that there is no such thing as absolute indubitability;  and more
importantly, that there are many cases where there is not even a reliable common-sense guideline
for distinguishing between practical dubitability and indubitability.  Secondly too few
experimentalists think sufficiently in terms of systems-theory:  how an apparently static
configuration can actually have a dynamic base.
(2) Digital-Dynamic Criterion (Discrete-element approach):
Can we construct a model dynamic system whose long-term emergent properties (given
appropriate input) will agree sufficiently with a chosen natural system?  I would agree with this
criterion  if  any of the following conditions seemed reasonable:–
  (i) If the brain were to operate entirely in terms of discrete on-off elements (which were “big
enough” to be “observable ” in some sense). 
I no longer believe this is true for brain models:  Whole-neurons have been discredited as
elements since about 1960;  synapses are dubious contenders until their positioning and
transmitter-release can be shown to operate in an entirely discrete manner;  and evidence in
favour of some use of continuous (field) effects is now formidable — see (3).
  (ii) If we were to understand the processes sufficiently well so that we could “abstract the
essence” of mental activity by using “functionally equivalent” digital subroutines to represent
comparatively large-scale mental subsystems.  There seems to be some following for this view
amongst biologically-naive computer-buffs;  but I am pretty sure that they are mistaken at this
point of time — though the situation might change eventually.
  (iii) If digital computers could approximate any required continuous phenomenon with sufficient
efficiency.  I used to think this might just be possible, provided a sufficiently “small or ablated”
brain were considered acceptable — or provided one were content to make piecemeal models and
cope with the difficulties entailed thereby.  At present however I believe that wave phenomena
are much more important and microscopic than has commonly been supposed, so I see absolutely
no prospect of adequate digital modelling (unless via (ii)).   This might not stop me using
programming language to describe theories formally, but I would first abandon all thought of
ever running such a program on a real digital computer.
                                                          
P
 also available as Chapter A2  in Thesis, Part A:  www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-A.pdf   (plus references in
the separate file: www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-Refs.pdf —  or see the BURA website for a 203-page file
which contains both)
Relevant extracts from a letter (dated 9 December 1975) to Professor W A Scott, discussing aspects of:
(1) testing by “external closure”;  and  (2&3) two aspects of testing by “internal closure”. #15/75
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(3) Field-Dynamic Criterion:  (continuous-“element” approach — or hybrid continuous and
discrete).   I will not bother to dispute the practical legitimacy of discrete elements (especially for
memory and symbolism) though one might argue that even the sub-atomic particles of physics are
“really” more waves than particles.  Suffice it to say that we may accept many discrete elements,
but that our dynamic model is not likely to be adequate unless it can also model very large
quantities of wave-phenomena;  e.g. for hologram activity (Pribram 1971).
There is some chance that traditional mathematical analytical techniques might serve here as an
important part of the model (and perhaps one could usefully program this discrete symbolism).
Anyhow if some workable and comprehensive medium can be constructed along such hybrid
lines, then this would be the way to validate theories of brain function.  I would certainly agree
that mere flowcharts which do not explain in detail how decisions are made and propagated (etc),
do not really get to grips with the problem.
————————————————————————
5HIHUHQFHV&KDSWHU,9
Bunge, M (1973)  Philosophy of Physics, Dordrecht/Holland: D Reidel
Pribram, K H (1971)  Languages of the Brain, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall
Traill, R.R. (1976a). “Acquisition of knowledge without transcendental assistance:
an extended Piagetian approach”. Kybernetes, 5(2), 73-82.
[Now also available as Chapters.A1&A2 in:  www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-A.pdf
plus references in the separate file: www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-Refs.pdf
 or see the BURA website for a 203-page file which contains both— RRT, 2007]                   4/75'partII
[“Chapter IV½” — an option to digress into physics and physiology]
[Logically, the next chapter could be   The gulf between behavioural psychology and fundamental
physiology: a systematic attempt to bridge the gap.  (Paper presented at the workshop on Memory
during the annual conference of the British Psychological Society, York, April 1976).   However:–
Originally this had already been published separately as  Monograph 15, Cybernetics Dept., Brunel
University, (1976);  —  and it now seems less confusing to maintain this separate identity,
especially as it is a comparatively long “short-paper”.  Moreover it is now easily accessed online as
www.ondwelle.com/OSM05.pdf  (2007).     (It is also cited above on page 7, on the same location-issue).
In any case, as well as discussing the current topic (Piaget on behaviour, and the physical
nature of his “scheme”), the paper also initiates a digression into somewhat separate issues
concerning possible infrared quantum signals within cell-tissue — a parallel-but-distinct line of
enquiry
 which has since come to include
• Brunel Monograph 24 (1977/1980) / Thesis, Part B (1978)  www.ondwelle.com/MolecMemIR.pdf;
• The journal article: “The case that mammalian intelligence ...” (1988).  Full ref.J on p.16 above.
• Book A (1999): “Mind and Micro-mechanism”, Chapters 3 and 7: www.ondwelle.com/BK0_MU6.PDF
• Book B (2000): “Physics and Philosophy of the Mind”, Part II:   www.ondwelle.com/BK1_V28.PDF 
•“Strange regularities in the geometry of myelin ...”
 (2005a)  www.ondwelle.com/OSM01.pdf
Thus there is some logic in “filing” this paper separately anyhow.] RRT, 2007
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On Modelling Reality:  The ‘camera fallacy’ in our approach to scientific
method, and sometimes to mental functioning
Chapter V
ABSTRACT
[from Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 29, 222-223; (June 1976)]
If we are not to accept a theistic view that knowledge and structure are ultimately given by an
unfathomable authority, then it seems to follow that we can only explain knowledge and structure
in terms of homeostatic self-organizing systems.  Moreover these systems must always, in the long
run, evolve entirely without any infallible guidance from ‘above’.
One unpalatable consequence of this is that the rules of logic must ultimately be accepted as
only empirical, and not absolutely transcendental as is often assumed (also see Gödel, 1931).
But more important is the disagreeable consequence that the status of such fundamental
concepts as ‘object’ and ‘observation’ can no longer be taken for granted at ‘face-value’.  This is
now reasonably well understood in Piagetian circles with respect to child development;  but the
same principles apply equally to the acquisition of knowledge by a scientific community — and this
is not so well appreciated.  (In both cases, the objective is to build or improve models of reality.)
In this light, current doctrines on Scientific Method deserve close scrutiny.   Scientific exper-
imentation corresponds (partially) to spontaneous scheme-exercise in the child, and each is
certainly essential in its own domain.  But such necessarily limited sampling-transactions with
reality are not sufficient on their own;  internal testing of the self-consistency of one’s model of
reality is also indispensable (and depends on the implied assumption that the reality outside is also
discernibly self-consistent).  In science, such internal testing is done by certain types of theorizing.
Because these issues have been poorly understood, and because some types of theorizing (such
as Hull, 1943) contribute little or nothing to internal closure, all non-trivial theorizing has tended to
fall into disrepute and there has been an overemphasis on experimentation — some of it quite
inconsequential due to an inadequate theoretical basis.
3RVWHU
What ultimately creates
the meaningful structure
          in . . . .    ?
“Democratic”
answer
“Authoritarian”
answer
a photo ? the camera  ( 8 ) photographer +
camera designer (4)
a computer design ? the computer  ( 8 ?) programmer +
hardware designer (4?)
individual a mental concept ?
   self-organizing
          brain (?)
God (?),     “Spiritual Self” (?)
Epistem-
ology
social a scientific law ?
   self-organizing
     scientific method (?)
Einstein (?).   Freud (?),
God (?)
,IWKLVLVWKHFRUUHFWDQVZHUIRUDPHQWDOFRQFHSW
then how is such self-organization achieved ?
Display paper presented at the York conference of the British Psychological Society, 2–5 April 1976.
This is an outline argument against the currently widely-accepted view that a theory is not worth even
considering unless it is “directly” testable.  #1/76
÷
{ ? ?
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Piagetian answer (for the individual) includes:–
(1) The evolutionary development of a material medium (brain)
   capable of performing adaptively according to the following —
6RZKDWDERXWWKHµVHOIRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶LQVFLHQWLILFPHWKRG
in fields where there is (as yet) no reliable authority ?
It is suggested that the growth of scientific knowledge happens in a manner which is functionally
equivalent to the growth of knowledge in the individual.   Thus it may be counter-productive if
we become over-awed by experimentation (external closure, (2) É) at the expense of interdiscip-
linary tests for self-consistency (internal closure, (3) Ê)
'LVFXVVLRQ
In practice, this overemphasis on experimentation (in non-clinical psychology) seems to take
the form of failing to accord credibility to any theory for which there is no immediately foresee-
able experimental test — (due to a misinterpretation of Popper (1934) ?).
Such a criterion does have value in combating metaphysical excesses.  Yet it is difficult to see
how physics and chemistry could have reached their present state of sophistication if such a rule
had been rigorously followed in those disciplines;  and indeed this was nearly the fate of Planck’s
quantum postulate, until Einstein formulated further internal corroboration, using other existing
data.
It is therefore proposed that an alternative criterion should also be effectively available:–
“Is there one or more method of corroborating the model using its internal structure
(and taking interdisciplinary data into account)?”
Or equivalently:
“Does the internal ‘logic’ of the postulated system have a mathematical-group struc-
ture in two or more dimensions?”
Or equivalently:
“Given the current state of knowledge about the supposed micro-constituents and their
properties, is the postulated system capable of accounting in detail for two or more
diverse sets of macro-observations (and at least be compatible with all other reliable
macro-observations)?”
(2) Transactions with ‘reality’
 (= Reality-testing/sampling or
“external closure” testing):
     Absolutely essential, but
not sufficient because
(i) a total sample is impossible
(especially with respect to the
future).
(ii) At least some aspects of
reality, such as the ‘law of nature’,
cannot be directly observed but
must be inferred or ‘intuited’.
Indeed this arguably applies to all
non-hereditary concepts.
(3) Selection according to
internal self-consistency
 (= ‘equilibration’ or
‘internal closure’).
     This is the key to the
“democratic” self-
organization of concepts,
without any absolute
method of validation —
ever!
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It still remains, perhaps, to formulate this in more practical terms.Q  For instance, how much
internal corroboration should be required, and in what circumstances?
Anyhow, in the absence of anything better, such an approach can be attempted in such
‘impossible’ areas of study as the ‘no-mans-land’ between psychology and physiology, where
experimentation is very slow in producing results with sufficient detail to give an adequate
explanation of the basic mechanisms (Traill, 1976b [Monograph 15]).
————————————————————————
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Q
  Since then, Professor Paul Thagard and his team have done just that — offering their “ECHO”
computerized coherence-evaluation system.  See:  P.Thagard (1992) Conceptual Revolutions,
Princeton University Press;  and the related website with working examples
( http://cogsci.uwaterloo.ca/JavaECHO/jecho.html ).
Also see my own discussion of this and related matters in:  www.ondwelle.com/OSM03.pdf
R
 
Thesis, Part A
 (1978):  www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-A.pdf  — plus references:
 www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-Refs.pdf  ——  or see the BURA website (Brunel University Research
Archive) for a 203-page file which contains both.
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Mechanistic Modelling — of consciousness?
Chapter VI
$%DVLFFRQFHSWV
 — See also Chapter I above, — and Traill (1976c: Monograph 15  www.ondwelle.com/OSM05.pdf )
(Fig A1)  Elements interacting with reality — [from page 9, above]
(Fig A2)  Consider each such linear element as encoded on a linear molecule and replicated many times. S
————————— oOo —————————
                                                          
S
 Diagram modified from page 9  — and used again later in Thesis, Part C (Fig. C5.2/2, original page-number 193), where it is
discussed in greater detail:    www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-C1-5.pdf     + references in the separate file:
www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-Refs.pdf ; — or see the BURA website  for a 203-page file which contains both.
Paper presented to the Philosophy of Psychology Group, during the York conference of the British
Psychological Society, 3 April 1976.
This paper elaborates further on the “linear micro-element” theory put forward in chapters I and II
within this volume (and in references cited therein), and also helps prepare the way for Thesis Part C:
[ www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-C1-5.pdf ,   www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-C6.pdf ... ff.   ——
 or see the BURA website  for a 203-page file which contains all these Part C files and references]
   #5/76
Basic Linear element (hereditary or fortuitous)
a b c
(recognition  (“action”) (satisfaction)
of state)
  Coordination  (necessary to produce observable behaviour)  achieved thus:
a f1
(recognize
“call”)
(facilitate
other)
(proceed if
facilitated)
p1
Σ
b
b
(c)
(satisfaction)
a f2
(recognize
“call”)
(facilitate
other)
(proceed if
facilitated)
p2
(action)
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%(OHPHQWVVWDELOLVHDOORZLQJFDWHJRULVDWLRQ
Another possible stabilising mechanism would be for the component elements to carry out
“practice-exercises” (during a suitable sleep-modeT).  Any elements “left out in the cold”, as not
being sufficiently involved in any cycle of ‘internal closure’, would also tend to become detached
and/or dissolved.  (See  Thesis, Chap.A1, §1.5, last two paragraphs.
[www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-A.pdf — (+ references: www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-Refs.pdf   or use BURA)]).
There may be many such stabilising mechanisms, possibly working in collaboration, but just
one or other of the above two would probably suffice for the development postulated below;  (and
this development could plausibly account for a third stabilising influence: see below, under (C2)).
  Such stability makes it feasible to form useful categories (lists) of similar types of element.
  This listing requires a new type of (control) element which has internal reference
(not sensory or motor)
                                                          
T
 This possible significance of sleep modes was later explored
 in §8.6 of  www.ondwelle.com/BK0_MU6.PDF   (Traill, 1999)
(B1)  Stability is acquired by coordinated-and-successful element-types.
(Perhaps because “satisfaction” brings an “approval-tag”
which protects the element from enzyme attack?
See Brunel Monograph 15 (Traill, 1976b), Fig.(V)b.)
[This diagram appeared again in 1978
(slightly modified) as Fig.C5.2/3 within:
www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-C1-5.pdf   
 (original-page 200)  RRT, 2007]
α
(label)
β1
(name1)
β2
(name2)
β3
(name3)
β4
(name4)
c
c
!!
referencing:
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
c
c c X !!
p1
f1
b
f2
p2
  b B
p3
f3
?
f5
f5
b
!!
b b
p6
f6
?  acceptable according to the
arbitrary criterion
?  eliminated as “not belonging”
New Type:
[old
basic
types]:
(Fig B2)
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       In Fig.B2, we may suppose that basic elements (of the original type) come to be “listed” in
the α-β1-β2-β3··· element, by means of “names” (βn, which are plausibly inhibited calls to the
basic element-labels in question: an).  There would be an arbitrarily set expectation (“intensive
definition”) as to what the membership criterion should be for the particular list;  (embodied,
perhaps, in the properties of the first member?).  The resulting list would amount to a tentative
“extensive definition” of the set’s common property.
Ill-matched members, such as (a4······) would plausibly be cast out for failing some sort of
uniformity-of-behaviour test (another type of internal closure?)
In appropriate lists, in which the criterion for membership turned out to be irrelevant to the
apparent needs of the organism as a whole, would presumably be dissolved (at the α-β1-β2···
level, only) through failure to gain enough support from internal or external closure — at this new
higher level.  Such dissolution could well follow the same basic procedures as used for dissolving
meaningless (an···)-type codings.
The third form of stabilisation for the (an···) elements (referred to above) would be likely to
arise as a consequence of their involvement in “kindred-spirit” lists — as a further type of internal
closure or (equivalently?) because they are now “embedded” within a larger communication-
“structure”.
————————— oOo —————————
&'HYHORSPHQWLQWRUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRID0DWKHPDWLFDO*URXSU
At least initially this is essentially a topological problem — learning to grope one’s way
round the cycle  A-N-C-M-A,  back again, and variations on this theme like how to take short-
cuts or how to compound moves.
                                                          
U
 This summarizes an explanation offered in Chapter I, above.  Some diagrams are essentially the same.
Also see the Kybernetes 5 paper (= Thesis Chapters A1 & A2: www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-A.pdf +refs.
—  or see the BURA website for the 203-page file which contains both).
The topic later appears again in a somewhat different treatment, as Chapter 8 within the book
Mind and Micro-mechanism:  www.ondwelle.com/BK0_MU6.PDF   (Traill, 1999), Ondwelle: Melbourne.
(Fig.C1)
Consider task of “learning the geography” of a square
internal
representation
being:–
       (parts only)
A  N
M  C
 a      n
 m      c
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
This list of relevant transitions, when it is complete in some internal-closure sense, constitutes
the embodiment of a mathematical group.  As such, it would be sensible to suppose that it would
acquire more stability than it previously had as a mere kindred-membered set.
Arguably, this development effectively promotes the  (αn...)  strings from being mere scheme-
elements of the “higher level” into schema elements of the “higher level”.   Arguably, too, this
completes a cycle producing the basic concepts of permanent objects, which can now be used as a
solid foundation for re-capitulating this whole process at a higher double-level again:–
  At last, a conscious (??)
  choice of routes.
(This choice takes us to a property
beyond those of a normal mathematical
group for these four states [a,m,n,c]. )
Reversal thanks to
temporary satisfaction
in other-than-c.
(Fig.C2)
The formation of a list for elements of the type:   “Transactions involving changes in my
relationship  (touch, eye-fixation, ...)  with this configuration in front of me”.
} β3 β4 β5
β6
β7
β2β1
α
etc
(Fig.C3) ... so eventually all transition possibilities become listed.
“GROUPS”
  and hence
“OBJECTS”
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'5HFXUVLRQ
Mental concepts for objects etc now constitute a new “toehold on reality” allowing a new
learning cycle to begin — using these new stable structures as basic elements, in much the same
way that primitive (inherited?) perceptual and motor elements have been used hitherto.
Note the two-stage nature of this recursive level (“Pre-operational” then “Operational”) in the
formation of sets (which may then become groups; — a third stage?)  This is formally equivalent
to the procedure postulated for the previous Sensori-Motor period.V
It looks as though this might be yet another double-level of development “above” that of the
Operational Period, and making use of its output-constructs.
So we seem to have something very like a recursive process which produces what amounts to
a hierarchical pyramid structure — stating from the base, and working its way upwards.  There
may well be irregularities and departures from this (especially in pathological cases?) but this
seems to be the basic pattern.
————————— oOo —————————
                                                          
V
 These are terms used by Piaget to identify various developmental stages.  E.g. see  footnote-25
(page 12) in the abovementionedU 1999 book:  www.ondwelle.com/BK0_MU6.PDF    —
or  H.G.Furth (1969). Piaget and Knowledge. Prentice-Hall: New Jersey.
(D1) Now objects have a special significance as such (cf. only primitive recognition previously;
a, m, n  for instance).
(D2) This allows the whole process to repeat itself, but at a “higher level”, (L2).
{(L2) = Pre-operational = listing of objects and other group-like concepts of similar status.
The “Operational Period” leads to new “super-groups” allowing the child to make conscious 
intentional transformations in objects, etc.}
(D3) The process may repeat again to give abstract thought:     “Formal operations”.  (L3)
(D4) Thus:
    Double level L3:
     
.................................................   etc
    Double level L2:      
   
..........
 
     
  
............   etc
social
    Double level L1: ......... pseudo-
groups    etc
   ?
      	

      Euclidean
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(&RQVFLRXVQHVV
How does consciousness relate to the pyramid structure?  If it is part of the structure, it would
arguably “be at” the current top level, and would therefore need to “move camp” whenever a new
double-layer happened to materialise.  But plausibly “consciousness” does not appear at all until
the Operational Period, and then arguably it might remain primarily associated with L2  (the
corresponding double-level).
It might, however make better sense to think of consciousness as some sort of communic-
ation-device-or-centre, separate from the pyramid-structure itself, and having a more-or-less
stable and unchanging status throughout the development process.
(It would be plausible to suppose that the highest existing level in the hierarchy would have
privileged access to such a consciousness-centre).
It seems likely that introspection would be limited to those parts of the total structure which
were:  subservient to consciousness  and/or  subservient to the current-highest-level.  It would
seem to follow then that one or both of these constructs would itself be more-or-less hidden from
direct introspection and so constitute a “black box”; — though there are, of course, methods for
inferring the contents of a black box.
Our answer to this will presumably depend very much on which broad model of
consciousness (see “E1”) we choose to accept;  and vice versa.   E.g. If we take consciousness to
be essentially separate from the pyramid, then we would be inclined to accept adult and childhood
consciousness as being qualitatively equivalent (and vice versa).
The concept “ego” is intimately bound up with the notion of “self-identity”; — in fact the two
terms were (rather rashly) used as interchangeable equivalents in Chapter II above.*   One could,
I suspect, make out a good case for claiming that consciousness is also intimately related with
“self-identity”;  and one might plausibly go on from there to explore the idea that ego and
consciousness are very closely related.
However that may be, I would suggest that the problem of how to relate “consciousness” to
the hierarchical pyramid, also applies to “ego”;  though I suspect that the best answers might
differ for the two cases.  Seen from the present context of the hierarchical pyramid, the
psychoanalytic  literature’s use of the term “ego” appears to be ambiguous — implying different
variations of relationship to the pyramid (as in E1 for consciousness).
Provisionally it might be useful to adopt working definitions which take  (i) consciousness as
being essentially separate from the hierarchy and  (ii) ego as being bound to level L2 — as
suggested in [Chapter II above — (Traill, 1976b)].
(E1) Could consciousness be “the highest existing level”?
(E2) Limits to Introspection?
(E3) Is a child’s consciousness homologous to an adult’s?
(E4) How is the ego involved, if at all?
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If ego is to be associated with the double-layer L2, then the superego, which develops later,
should probably be placed somewhere higher in the pyramid:  L3 for instance, as suggested in
Chapter  II above.  But clearly this idea need further investigation and explication.
5HIHUHQFHV&KDSWHU9,
Traill, R.R. (1978 [but written 1975-1976, before the short papers]). “Analytical theory of sensori-motor
spatial development”. Kybernetes, 7, 61-71. — [Then still “in press”.     Now available online
within Thesis, Part A (Chapter A3):   www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-A.pdf ,   plus references in the
separate file:
 www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-Refs.pdf  — or use the BURA websiteR] #7/75
Traill, R R (1976a), Sensori-Motor Development of object concepts: A Mechanistic Hypothesis.
Presented at the tenth annual conference of the Australian Psychological Society:
(Chapter I  in this volume) #11/75
Traill, R R (1976b), Self-construction of Personal Identity:  an extension of the mechanistic
mental object hypothesis. Presented at the tenth annual conference of the Australian
Psychological Society:  (Chapter II  in this volume) #12/75
Traill, R.R. (1976c).  The Gulf between Behavioural Psychology and Fundamental Physiology:
a systematic attempt to bridge the gap.  Monograph 15, Brunel University Cybernetics
Dept.  —  from York BPS conference (Workshop on Memory, April 1976)
— (2007) available online as 
 www.ondwelle.com/OSM05.pdf #16/75
(E5) And Superego?
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Acceptance of the Validity of ‘Internal Closure’:
Is this the basis of a ‘school of philosophy’ ?
Chapter VII
(Second letter)  12 May 1976
Dear Professor Haggard
On second thoughts, I suppose that the most correct answer to your question (about
philosophical schools of thought) would have to be that I have regarded myself as a rabid
Piagetian — making capital out of his (poorly defined) concept of “equilibration”, which he
presumably borrowed from psychoanalysis (e.g. see Fenichel (1946/1971), The Psychoanalytic
Theory of Neurosis; p.32; copy enclosed)*    Both the Freudians and the Piagetians act upon a
philosophy of knowledge-acquisition-aided-by-“internal-closure”  —  though they do not seem to
have “sold” the philosophical angle explicitly enough — at least not in English.
Yours sincerely,
R. R. Traill
————————— oOo —————————
{ Editorial comment (RRT 15-6-1976):  Such analogies should not, of course, be relied
on blindly.  E.g. a jigsaw is a static “system” (endogenously speaking);  whereas
the patient of a psychoanalyst is a dynamic system subject to a rather low-resolution
modelling porocess;   and then again real systems studied by the “hard” sciences are
also dynamic but subject to hopefully-precise modelling (in some sense). 
  However, the dynamic aspects or fine detail may be considered as “additional
jigsaw pieces” which must also be fitted into the picture;  this makes the task more
difficult — but any answer is then more likely to be correct. }
                                                          
*
   “ Freud once compared psychoanalysis to a jigsaw puzzle, in which the aim is
to construct a complete picture out of its fragments (550).  There is but one cor-
rect solution.  So long as this is not discovered, one can perhaps recognize iso-
lated bits, but there is no coherent whole.  If the correct solution is found, there
can be no doubt as to its validity, for each fragment fits into the general whole.
A final solution reveals a unified coherence in which every hitherto incompreh-
sible detail has found its place.  And, also before this happy point is reached,
dynamic-economic changes in the state of the patient are decisive for derermin-
ing whether or not the procedure of the analyst is adequate.1
    
1
 Many problems merely touched upon in this chapter are discussed at some length in (438). ”
— O.Fenichel (1946/1971), The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis,
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Extracts from letters to Professor M.P.Haggard in answer to his query about “the school in philosophy
of science that you most closely ally with...”.  This query arose in the context of Chapter V above:
              {“On Modelling Reality”, York conference}. #7/76
[At that time, I had had little exposure to schools of philosophy as such — so it is debatable whether I
actually answered the question!   Nevertheless I did take the opportunity to find some interesting
precedents within psychoanalytic theory and elsewhere.   Since then, Paul Thagard has also cited other
cases in his book Conceptual Revolutions (1992),   —   and in the software at his ECHO website
 http://cogsci.uwaterloo.ca/JavaECHO/jecho.html , as discussed in my recent paper  www.ondwelle.com/OSM03.pdf
(Traill, 2005c).       RRT, 2007]
3rd chapter on
scientific method
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(Third letter)  30 June 1976
Dear Professor Haggard
Some more thoughts about schools of philosophy related to my approach.
(1) Perhaps “structuralism” is of some relevance here, (after all Piaget falls into this category,
and has written a book with this title).   Consider the following pseudo-definition which I have
just come across:    “One could say a structure is a combination and a relation of formal elements
which reveal their logical coherence within given objects of analysis”.     (My emphasis)
  —  J.Ehrman (1970) Structuralism.  Doubleday: Garden City, NY.  (page ix).
“Logical coherence” seems to be much the same as “internal closure”;F  (in fact this might
form the basis of a satisfactory definition of “logic”).
I think the thing that disturbs me about this school is that they seem to be rather undiscerning
in their choice of “formal elements”.  I prefer to also see a way of explaining the existence and
stability of these “elements”.*  This seems to lead to an infinite regress, but only if one is totally
purist.  In practice, one must be content with “adequate” explanations at each level, until
axiomatization does become “reasonably” indisputable at one’s lowest level.
(2) Further to that quote from Fenichel, I enclose a copy of an interesting double page from
Freud:  (1914/1957) Collected Papers, IV, 34-35.‡   ——   “On Narcissism: an introduction”.
(3) Obviously writers on Cybernetics (alias “General Systems Theory”, or as I like to put it
“The whatever-it-is about any dynamic system which enables it to hang together for longer than
random expectancy”) will also be relevant;  especially Ross Ashby  (see references in my ..... )W.
Yours sincerely,
R. R. Traill
                                                          
*
 (and their substructure too if necessary, and so on).
W
 the two Kybernetes papers (then available as pre-publication copies), whose references are now in
www.ondwelle.com/Mol-Intel-Refs.pdf .    Also see  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Ross_Ashby
   
‡
                                   “ One dislikes the thought of
abandoning observation for barren theoretical discus-
sions, but all the same we must not shirk an attempt
at explanation.  Conceptions such as that of an ego-
libido, an energy pertaining to the ego-instincts, and
so on, are certainly neither very easy to grasp nor is
their content sufficiently rich ;  a speculative theory of
these relations of which we are speaking would in the
first place require as its basis a sharply defined concept.
But I am of the opinion that that is just the difference
between a speculative theory and a science founded
upon constructions arrived at empirically.  The latter
will not begrudge to speculation its privilege of a
smooth, logically unassailable structure, but will itself
be gladly content with nebulous, scarcely imaginable
conceptions, which it hopes to apprehend more clearly
in the course of its development, or which it is even
prepared  to  replace  by  others.     For  these  ideas  are
not the basis of the science upon which everything
rests :  that, on the contrary, is observation alone.
They are not the foundation-stone, but the coping of the
whole structure, and they can be replaced and discarded
without damaging it.  The same thing is happening in
our day in the science of physics, the fundamental
notions of which as regards matter, centres of force,
attraction, etc., are scarcely less debatable than the
corresponding ideas in psycho-analysis.
 .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .
          In the complete absence of any theory of the
instincts which would help us find our bearings, we
may be permitted, or rather, it is incumbent upon us,
in the first place to work out any hypothesis to its
logical conclusion, until it either fails or becomes
confirmed.  ”
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